

### SAFETY PROGRAMME FOR EMBARKING COUNTRIES

KINS-IAEA Workshop on Safety Review and Inspection Methodologies for Quality Assurance Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) 13-17 May 2019

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IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

### CONTENT

 IAEA Safety Standards
 SSG-16 IAEA Safety Guide
 IAEA Assistances for Capacity Building at Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power
 Review Services for Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power



### CONTENT

#### IAEA Safety Standards

#### ➤ SSC-16 IAEA Safety Guide

IAEA Assistances for Capacity Building at Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power

Review Services for Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power



### **International Atomic Energy Agency**



# ✓ Established 1957 ✓ 170 MSs (as of 30 April 2018) ✓ 2,500 staff

#### **3 pillars**

- Nuclear Science and Technology
  - Safety and Security
- Safeguards and Verification



#### **IAEA Safety Standards**

#### IAEA Statute (Article III.A.6)

- "To establish or adopt... [in consultation with...] standards of safety for the protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property"
- "...and to provide for the application of these standards"




### **Status of the IAEA Safety Standards**

#### Safety Standards are:


- Non-binding on Member States, but may be adopted by them;
- Binding for IAEA's own activities;
- Binding on States in relation to operations assisted by the IAEA or States wishing to enter into project agreements with IAEA; or
- Voluntarily binding for States that have embedded IAEA SSs in their national regulations.



### **Hierarchy of the Safety Standards**



### **Fundamental Safety Principles**



### **Coverage of the Safety Standards**



Collection of General Safety Guides (GSG) and Specific Safety Guides (SSG)



http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/

### **Application of the Safety Standards**

#### Notable use by MSs:

- Adoption/Adaptation into a MSs legal framework (e.g. China, Netherlands, Pakistan, etc.)
- Use of standards as main reference to establish regulations (e.g. Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, India)
- Use of standards as reference to review national standards (by many other States and also by Industry) and as benchmark for harmonization



### **Application of the Safety Standards**

- By the IAEA:
  - Safety reviews;
  - TC missions;
  - Training activities.
- Through the process of safety related conventions.
- Cosponsoring organizations.

IAEA Safety Standards for protecting people and the environment			
Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety			
General Safety Requirements No. GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1)	IAEA Safety Standards for protecting people and the environment		
	Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities		
	General Safety Requirements No. GSR Part 4 (Rev. 1)	IAEA Safety Standards for protecting people and the environment	
IS.		Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency	
ons.		And generating the metanoc and the second second second second second and a second second second second second second General Safety Requirements No. GSR Part 7	





#### > IAEA Safety Standards


#### SSG-16 IAEA Safety Guide

IAEA Assistances for Capacity Building at Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power

Review Services for Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power



#### **Embarking on Nuclear Power**



Increasing number of countries considering the introduction of nuclear power

(~30 countries declared their interest or intention )

(having no or little experience in building, operating or regulating nuclear facilities)





IAEA Safety Standards for protecting people and the environment Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme

Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-16

Need to establish an appropriate and comprehensive national safety infrastructure in compliance with the IAEA SSs


FUNDAMENTALS

REOUIREMENTS

GUIDES

- to ensure safety and
- to gain public trust at national and international level.

#### Why a new Specific Safety Guide?





> A systematic programme has to be implemented for developing or upgrading the national <u>nuclear safety infrastructure</u> progressively to ensure meeting the safety requirements at each phase and also for being prepared for the subsequent phases.

#### IAEA Safety Standards

#### Why a new Specific Safety Guide?

Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme

Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-16

Existing IAEA SSs were providing all requirements that should be meet for establishment of an adequate and effective nuclear infrastructure,

- But, guidance was missing on
  - how this should be established progressively in different phases of implementation of a nuclear power project; and
  - how they will identify their needs in a timely manner.


> A number of embarking countries had requested from the IAEA this guidance, which will show them

- which elements of a nuclear safety infrastructure that they will need for ensuring safety in different phases of implementation of a NPP; and
- what&when they should do for progressive establishment of an nuclear safety infrastructure defined in relevant SSs.


Work started in 2008, completed in 2011, SSG-16 issued on December 2011.




#### The main 4 roles of SSG-16




#### The Relation with Other Relevant IAEA Docs






#### **Progressive implementation of the IAEA Safety Requirements**



	GSR Part 1 - Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety
죕	GSR Part 2 - Leadership and Management for Safety (current GS-R-3)
aireme	GSR Part 3 - Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources (current BSS115)
ty requir	GSR Part 4 - Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities
A safety	GSR Part 5 - Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste
of IAE	GSR Part 6 - Decommissioning and Termination of Activities (current WS-R-5)
cation	GSR Part 7 - Emergency Preparedness and Response (current GS-R-2)
e applica	SSR1 - Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations (current NS-R-3)
gressiv	SSR 2.1 - Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design and Construction (current NS-R-1)
Prof	SSR 2.2 - Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (current NS-R-2)
	SSR 6 - Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (current TS-R-1)
	· · · · ·



for each relevant IAEA Safety Requirements publication, at which stages:

- there should be awareness of the requirements;
- implementation of the requirements should be started;
- requirements should be fully implemented.

The initial degree of the application of these requirements may vary from State to State depending on the use of radioactive sources and nuclear installations other than NPPs before considering the nuclear power option.

#### SSG 16 Self-Assessment

#### Methodology

- Question sets derived from actions,
- Completed and reviewed in March 2011.

#### IT tool

- A user-friendly software (IRIS) developed to facilitate the conduct of the self-assessment, (http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/regulatory-infrastructure/iris-tool.asp)
- Available since September 2013.

#### **Relevant IAEA Assistances**

- Training workshops on SSG-16, the self-assessment methodology and the utilization of the self-assessment software (IRIS),
- Expert missions to assist preparation and/or implementation of action plans based on the self-assessment results.





#### > IAEA Safety Standards


#### > SSG-16 IAEA Safety Guide

#### IAEA Assistances for Capacity Building at Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power

#### Review Services for Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power




### **IAEA Assistances concerning safety**



22

#### **SSG 16 Modules**





http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/safety-infrastructure/default.asp?s=117&l=118

#### **Example: Safety Package for Module 1**



FA

#### **IAEA Assistance for Embarking Countries**

#### Specific Workshops under the Module 1

- WS1: Workshop on Developing National Infrastructure including Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Infrastructure for Safe Implementation of Nuclear Power Programme
- WS2: Workshop on Regulatory Framework
- WS3: Workshop on Safety Regulations
- WS4: Workshop on Licensing Process
- WS5: Workshop on Safety Review and Assessment by the Regulatory Body
- WS6: Workshop on Regulatory Inspection and Enforcement
- WS7: Workshop on Interactions with the Public and Other Interested Parties in Regulatory Activities
- WS8: Workshop on Management System for the Regulatory Body
- WS9: Workshop on Staffing the Regulatory Body and Development of the Competencies for the Conduct of Regulatory Functions, including the Use of External Support Organizations



#### **Expert Missions under the Module 1**

- licensing/authorization process for NPPs
- regulations and guides relevant to the licensing of an NPP
- planning safety review and assessment for an NPP by the regulatory body, including workforce planning
- planning and performing regulatory oversight and regulatory enforcement
- communication with public and involvement of interested parties in the regulatory process
- management system of the regulatory body
- staffing and competence building for the regulatory body



#### **Expert Missions under the Module 1**

 For countries that have no already existing system or implementation on the areas/subjects for which the expert mission is requested:

The experts will help to develop/establish a national system by providing guidance and assistance on the areas/subjects listed.

- If NPP technology and vendor has not been determined by the requesting embarking country yet, this guidance and assistance will be based on relevant IAEA safety standards and therefore it will be technology neutral.
- If the requesting embarking country has already decided NPP technology and vendor, the guidance and assistance may also refer to/based on vendor country system, approach or method where appropriate.





#### **Expert Missions under the Module 1**

 For countries that have an already existing system or implementation on the areas/subjects for which the expert mission is requested:

- To explore the effectiveness, efficiency, adequacy and consistency of the existing national system or implementation concerning the areas/subjects listed above and to identify gaps and inconsistencies to fix and to identify opportunities for improvement

• For this purpose, the expert mission will review existing system or implementation of the requesting embarking country to identify gaps, inconsistencies and opportunities for improvement and then will provide guidance, recommendations and/or assist the requesting embarking country for filling identified gaps, correcting identified inconsistencies and applying appropriate improvements. When conducting the initial preliminary review part of the expert mission, relevant parts of the IRRS Guidelines may be referenced.



#### **IAEA Assistance for Embarking Countries**

#### Education and training

- oriented towards sustainability of national programmes.
- focus on train the trainers.
- extensive collection of training packages for self learning and class room use developed and distributed world wide.



#### FEs and SVs



### Education & Training in Nuclear Installation Safety

Main Page - http://www-ns.iaea.org/training/ni/materials.asp?s=9&l=75



#### Training for Regulatory Bodies

http://www-ns.iaea.org/training/ni/train-reg-bod.asp

#### Nuclear Safety & Security

#### Nuclear Safety & Security

- Safety & Security Framework
- Technical Areas
- Services for Member States
- Safety & Security Publications
- Conventions & Codes
- Training

#### Home page

Events calendar

- Incidents & emergencies
- Nuclear installation safety
- Home page
- Safety Standards
- SARCoN
- Regulatory body
- Fundamentals & BPTC
- Online Videos
- Workshops
- Tools & Networking
- Nuclear security
- Radiation, transport & waste
- Meetings

Special projects



ΑΕΑ

#### **Training for Regulatory Bodies**

#### Steering Committee Reports



Following the conclusions of various IAEA Technical Meetings related to developing and ensuring regulatory competence in Member States with nuclear power plants, the establishment of a Steering Committee to discuss issues, exchange information and advise the IAEA on how best to support the Member States's training programmes was strongly recommended, Terms of Reference for the Steering Committee were prepared and approved. The Steering Committee was established formally in 2009, and since then it has been successfully implementing its strategic work plan.

Amongst the achievements of the Steering Committee on competence of human resources of regulatory bodies in Member States with nuclear power plants, it can be noted the following:

Revision and updating of the Systematic Assessment of Competence Needs and its associated questionnaires and software based selfassessment tool

- Research on best systems to ensure and manage regulatory competence. A safety report collecting current knowledge and good practices on management systems for regulatory competence is under preparation
- Sharing training courses and documentation amongst its members and creating a compilation of websites and internet resources useful for training of regulatory bodies available from the Member States and the IAEA
- Promoting and giving advice on the IAEA safety standards related to developing, ensuring and managing regulatory competence.

#### **Regulatory Control Book** (Textbook + Workbook)



Related documents FECDOC 1254 (2 mb) ▶ E&T Leaflet

Steering Committee

#### Regulatory Control of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)

(A) IAEA

Superseeds **TECDOC 1254** 

Safety Reports Series

**Managing Regulatory** 

**Body Competence** 

No.79



The purpose of this book is to support IAEA training courses and workshops in the field of regulatory control of nuclear power plants as well as to support the regulatory bodies of Member States in their own training activities. The target group is the professional staff members of nuclear safety regulatory bodies supervising nuclear power plants and having duties and responsibilities in the following regulatory fields: regulatory framework; regulatory organization; regulatory guidance; licensing and licensing documents; assessment of safety; and regulatory

inspection and enforcement. Important topics such as regulatory competence and quality of regulatory work as well as emergency preparedness and public communication are also covered.

Regulatory Control of Nuclear Power Plants - Part A & B (2.4MB)

Page links

Training the Staff

Regulatory Control of NPPs

#### **Training Courses**

1- Basic Professional Training Course on Nuclear Safety (BPTC), and 2- Training Course on Regulatory Control of Nuclear Power Plants

#### Nuclear Safety & Security Nuclear Energy Nuclear Applications Safeguards Technical Cooperation **Fundamentals and Basic Professional** Navigation NIS Training **Training Courses** Safety Standards Training Nuclear Safety & Security Technical Areas **Regulatory Body Training Fundamentals** Safety & Security Publications Workshops Please note that the E-Textbooks below are not IAEA publications. The Conventions & Codes Textbooks have been made available hereby to the interested reader in order **Fundamentals & BPTC** to support self-study for those who are unfamiliar with basic nuclear Services for Member States engineering. Specific expert knowledge Special projects OPEN E-TEXTBOOK Reactor Physics Training tools & Networking Training A Home pa OPEN E-TEXTBOOK Fundamentals of Thermal Hydraulics Events calendar OPEN E-TEXTBOOK Basic Safety Concepts Fundamentals and BPTC Incidents & emergencies OPEN E-TEXTBOOK EDF NPP Operating Safety Handbook (RC) **Basic Professional Training** Nuclear installation safet Course on Nuclear Safety Nuclear security BPTC - Chapter 22 Radiation, transport & waste Communicating about nuclear Basic Professional Training Course on Nuclear Safety technology Meetings (BPTC) BASIC PROFESSIONAL TRAINING COURSE ON UCLEAR SAFETY E-Textbooks Argeine, August 2001 Good 4 3 2 1 0 Poor 00000 **BPTC - CHAPTER 22** rate this page COMMUNICATING ABOUT NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY Vienna, August 2010 read more Education and Traini The Basic Professional Training Course on Nuclear Safety (BPTC) is intended to provide a broad overview of all the safety concepts and their application to nuclear power plants and research reactors design and operation. Its nature and scope are primarily oriented to junior professionals recently involved in nuclear safety-related activities. It is also appropriate for highly specialize professionals who lack a broader view of nuclear safety. OPEN E-TEXTBOOK Basic Professional Training Course on Nuclear Safety

#### **DVD Training Materials**



Dedicated page for every workshop



http://www-ns.iaea.org/training/ni/fund-bpc.asp

32

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# Basic Professional Training Course in Nuclear Safety (BPTC)

 To provide training on basic safety concepts and their application to NPP, Research Reactors and Fuel Cycle Facilities

 To present the basic principles and key issues of nuclear safety

- Radiation protection in nuclear facilities
  Design of a nuclear reactor, interfaces with security;
- . Safety classification of structures, systems and components
- . Deterministic accident analysis and probabilistic safety analysis
- . Links between probabilistic, deterministic analysis and risk informed decision making
- . Siting and environmental impact assessment
- . Operational safety, including operational feedback
- . Limiting conditions for operation;
- . (...)
- . Public communication.



#### **Regulatory Control Course**

#### understanding of

 the safety infrastructure needed for a nuclear power programme

#### overview of


 the nuclear safety issues to be faced by a country having a nuclear power programme

- 1. Regulatory Framework
- 2. Regulatory Organisation
- 3. Regulatory Guidance
- 4. Licensing and licensing document
- 5. Safety in the Construction Phase
- 6. Safety in Operation



#### **Knowledge and Experience Sharing Workshops**

http://www-ns.iaea.org/training/ni/workshops.asp



## Safety Assessment Advisory Programme (SAAP) for Countries Embarking on a Nuclear Power Programme

The objective of the Safety Assessment Advisory Programme (SAAP), performed at the request of a Member State embarking on nuclear power, is to advise on the systematic identification of nuclear safety assessment competency and capacity needs for establishing a nuclear power plant (NPP) programme and to support the development of an action plan for competency and capacity building based on the Safety Assessment Education and Training (SAET) Programme.

The SAAP is organized in two phases with the aim to actively engage the recipient Member State in the process of identifying the needs and establishing the safety assessment capacity building programme.

The first phase (Introduction to safety assessment and screening of initial situation in the country) is usually implemented through a workshop and has the objective to familiarize the management of all organizations involved in the new nuclear power programme with the basic concepts of safety assessment and to support them in identifying the specific needs of their organization in this area.

The second phase (Translating identified national safety assessment priorities into a comprehensive competency building programme) is based on the results of the phase 1 and aims at developing a detailed nuclear safety assessment competency and capacity map for the beneficiary Member State as well as a capacity building action plan based on the SAET







 IAEA Safety Standards
 SSG-16 IAEA Safety Guide
 IAEA Assistances for Capacity Building at Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power

Review Services for Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power



- Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR)
- Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)
- Site and External Events Design (SEED)
- Design and Safety Assessment Review Service (DSARS)
- Pre-Operational Safety Review Team (Pre-OSART)
- Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) Service



## INIR

The Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) is a holistic, IAEA coordinated peer review.

The major objective of an INIR mission is to assist the MS in determining its infrastructure status and to identify further development needs;

It intends to build upon the MS self-evaluation in order to determine areas where further work would be beneficial.

The INIR is geared to helping the MS to identify areas for further action and assistance, including that from the IAEA.



- The 'Integrated Regulatory Review Service' (IRRS), a peer review
  - evaluates the status of compliance of States' regulatory infrastructure with the Safety Standards
  - provides for discussion among experienced regulators regarding both regulatory technical and policy issues
  - provides an opportunity to share regulatory experiences and to harmonize regulatory approaches among States
- Objective: to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the national regulatory infrastructure of Member States for nuclear, radiation, radioactive waste and transport safety and security of radioactive sources whilst recognizing the ultimate responsibility of each State to ensure safety in the above areas.






### Structure of the IRRS 'Core' and 'Additional' Areas

 Modules 1 – 10 and 'Policy Issues' represent the *core areas* of every IRRS mission.

#### Modules 11 and 12 and 'Tailored Module' represent additional areas which may be included in the scope, in accordance with the regulatory oversight in the host country.





## Structure of the IRRS

### 'Additional' Areas of the IRRS

- 'Additional' areas of the IRRS are optionally included as appropriate to the State and upon its request.
- Modules 11 & 12



Additional areas which may be included in IRRS:

- Transport (TS-R-1)
- Control of medical exposures (BSS + RS-G-1.5 + ICRP)
- Occupational radiation protection (BSS, RS-G-1.1 ~1.4, 1.6)
- Control of radioactive discharges and materials for clearance (BSS + GSR Part 5 + WS-G-2.3)
- Environmental monitoring for public radiation protection purposes (BSS + RS-G-1.8)
- Control of chronic exposures and remediation (BSS + WS-G-3.1)
- Interface with nuclear security

## Structure of the IRRS

Modular Structure of the IRRS

- The IRRS has a modular form designed to be tailored to address both generic and country-specific needs and to review circumstances where the scope of regulatory responsibility may be changing.
- Each IRRS Module is divided into various sub-sections or 'elements' which correspond to the requirements set out in the relevant IAEA Safety Standards.



### Structure of the IRRS - Modular Structure of the IRRS

- Modules 1 to 4 cover the essential elements of the framework for safety at the State level.
- Modules 5 to 9 represent the five core regulatory processes which apply to all regulated facilities and activities.



TECHNICAL ISSUES						
1.	1. Responsibilities and functions of the government					
2.	2. Global nuclear safety regime					
3.	3. Responsibilities and functions of the regulatory body					
4. Management system of the regulatory body						
Core regulatory processes	<ol> <li>5. Authorization</li> <li>6. Review and Assessment</li> <li>7. Inspection</li> <li>8. Enforcement</li> <li>9. Regulations and Guides</li> </ol>	Core regulatory processes	Facilities and activities	Radiation sources Research reactors Nuclear power plants Fuel cycle facilities Waste facilities Decommissioning	Facilities and activities	
10. Emergency preparedness and response						
11. Thematic areas						
12. Interfaces with nuclear security						
Tailored modules						
Policy Issues						

## Tailored Module for Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power

- Tailored Module for Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power
  - The IRRS is generally structured to review existing regulated facilities or activities.
  - A separate and unique module has been developed to review the status of national preparedness to embark on a safe nuclear power programme. IAEA safety guide SSG 16 - "Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme" - forms the basis of this IRRS tailored module.



Tailored Module for Countries Embarking on Nuclear Power

Implementation of SSG-16 target organizations IRRS Guidelines Section 5.3.1 and Appendix II.

- The SSG-16 actions considered would be those that are to be implemented by the government (in the context of legal and regulatory framework) and the regulatory body.
- Regarding the operating organization, the IRRS review would be to ensure there was an underlying regulation in place or planned such that there would be a required action to be taken by the operating organization.



### SEED

- The <u>Site and External Events Design</u> (SEED) review service is a bundled service designed to assist the Member States through the different stages of the site selection, site assessment and design of structures, systems and components against the site specific external and internal hazards.
- The SEED review service provides an independent review the site evaluation and the designed safety of the nuclear installation against the demands of the external hazards both natural and human induced and internal hazards.
- SEED is a bundled service designed to assist the IAEA's Member States through the different stages of nuclear installation site selection, site assessment, and design of structures, systems and components, taking into consideration site-specific external and internal hazards.
- On request from a Member State, SEED provides an independent review of site evaluation and safety design of a nuclear installation against the demands posed by external hazards, whether natural or human-induced, as well as internal ones. The service consists of the following six modules, out of which the requesting Member State can select one or more depending on needs.



### SEED

#### Module 1

Review on Site and Design Safety Regulations: Reviews on conformance of national regulations for siting and design of nuclear installations with the IAEA Safety Standards.

#### Module 2 •

Review of the Site Selection Process: Reviews on the process related to safety to select a suitable site for a nuclear installation. The process aims at assessing those site-related factors, which ensure that the combination of site and installation does not pose an unacceptable risk to people and the environment over the lifetime of the installation.

#### • Module 3

Site Evaluation Review: Includes an independent review of the adherence to IAEA safety requirements and the level of detail in site investigation to establish the site's capacities to support the installation's design needs. Also reviews the application of management systems and quality assurance programme in site evaluation.



## SEED

### • Module 4

Environmental Impact Assessment Review: Reviews the adherence to IAEA environmental impact assessment requirements covering collection and analysis of data, analysis of impacts, mitigation of impacts and environmental monitoring programmes.

#### • Module 5

Site Monitoring Review: Reviews methodologies and plans of monitoring of safety-related site characteristics and external natural and human-induced hazards covering both pre-operational and operational stages of monitoring programmes.

#### • Module 6

Safety Review of Structures, Systems and Components against External Hazards: Reviews the adherence to the IAEA safety requirements in the design of an installation's structures, systems and components to meet the demands of a sitespecific hazard. It covers assessments of design, safety margins and probabilistic safety assessment against external events.



### **TSR** (Technical Safety Review (TSR))

- The IAEA provides to the requesting MS a tailored, independent evaluation of the plant design safety and safety assessment documentation and to make recommendations for enhancements and improvements to safety. It incorporates services dedicated to different subject areas:
  - Design Safety (DS)
  - Generic Reactor Safety (GRS)
  - Safety Requirements (SR)
  - Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA)
  - Accident Management (AM)
  - Periodic Safety Review (PSR)



### Design Safety (DS)

#### Description

Review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts to review the safety of designs of nuclear power plants against the IAEA Safety Standards. The review can be limited to specific technical areas

#### Objective

To assist the requesting Member State to review the safety documentation for nuclear power plants and to make recommendations in order to enhance safety

#### Process

The process includes preparatory work by the review team and review meetings that usually last two weeks. Funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects

#### Output

A report summarizing the findings of the review and, if needed, includes a set of recommendations to improve the adherence to the IAEA Safety Standards.







### Generic Reactor Safety (GRS)

#### Description

Review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts to review the safety case of new reactor design against the requirements of IAEA Safety Standards on Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part 4 (Rev.1)) and Safety of NPPs: Design (SSR-2/1 (Rev.1))

#### Objective

To enable the requesting party to understand to which extent the safety case is complete and comprehensive in addressing the requirements of the safety standards

#### Process


The process takes between 6 to 8 months to complete. Funded by the requesting party

#### Output

A report summarizing the extent to which the safety case addresses the requirements and, if needed, recommendations for improvement of completeness and comprehensiveness are provided







### Safety Requirements (SR)

#### Description

The Safety Requirements (SR) Review is a peer review service conducted by the IAEA staff and international experts to review the national safety requirements for the design or safety assessment of nuclear power plants against the IAEA Safety Standards. The review can be limited to specific requirements of interest

#### Objective

To assist the requesting Member State in the process of issuing or revising national safety requirements for the design or safety assessment of nuclear power plants to enhance safety

#### Process

The process includes preparatory work by the review team and review meetings that usually last two weeks and is funded by the requesting party or through technical cooperation projects

#### Output



A report summarizing the findings of the review and, if needed, includes a set of recommendations or suggestions to improve the adherence to the IAEA Safety Standards



### **EPREV**


The <u>Emergency Preparedness Review</u> (EPREV) Service is a service provided by the IEC to appraise preparedness for nuclear and/or radiological emergencies in Member States. Various types of missions are available within the EPREV programme. The scope and depth are decided during discussions between the requesting Member State and the IAEA.

### **Pre-OSART**

A Pre-operational Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission can take place at a nuclear power project during the commissioning phase when many decisions are being taken that will affect operational safety throughout the life of the plant. The mission provides the greatest value if it is conducted from three to six months before the initial fuel loading when plant processes and procedures affecting safety are already established, plant staff are recruited and trained and some systems are taken over for temporary or final operation. This allows the review to focus on how well the plant is prepared for initial fuel loading, reactor start-up and subsequent plant operations.



## **Safety Review Services for New Comers**



# CONCLUSION



"The Agency has a key role to play in ensuring that this expansion in nuclear power takes place in an efficient, responsible and sustainable manner."



## International Atomic Energy Agency



Thank you for your attention!!!

