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ANSN Homepage
Self Assessment Co-ordination Group
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The Capacity Building Coordination Group (CBCG) was established at the 10th meeting of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network’s (ANSN’s) Steering Committee in October 2009 to coordinate the activities of the ANSN’s various Topical Groups and to promote the development of information technology modules in support of capacity building. The CBCG subsequently made several important contributions towards the strengthening of capacity building activities in the ANSN member countries in cooperation with the ANSN Topical Groups and the Information Technology Support Group.
Taking into account a number of activities undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with direct implications for the CBCG’s work — such as the development of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, adopted at the 55th regular session of the IAEA General Conference in September 2011, and in particular Action 8 (“Facilitate the development of the infrastructure necessary for Member States embarking on a nuclear power programme”) and Action 9 (“Strengthen and maintain capacity building”) therein, as well as the publication of Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme (IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-16) in 2011 — the CBCG was reorganized as the Capacity Building Management Group (CBMG) in October 2012. The purpose of this restructuring was to strengthen the Group’s function of promoting self-assessment by ANSN member countries as well as conducting regional and national activities to support and promote ANSN member countries’ capacity building more effectively and efficiently.
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 Why is the ANSN facilitating 'Capacity Building'?
- Asia is the region most actively embarking on or expanding nuclear power programmes. Every member State of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN) retains the independent role, the responsibility and the right of ownership to initiate, design, develop and implement its own sustainable nuclear safety infrastructures. However, not all States have adequate capacity. Especially with regard to nuclear safety infrastructures, sufficient levels of nuclear experience and expertise, and the required legal and regulatory frameworks necessary to support their growth in this area.
- The ANSN is functioning as a platform for facilitating sustainable regional cooperation in capacity building for establishing safety infrastructure for nuclear power programmes through dynamic and interactive knowledge and experience sharing.
What is 'Capacity Building'?
Capacity Building is: the systematic and integrated approach to develop and continuously improve individual, organizational and regulatory competences and capabilities necessary for achieving and sustaining high levels of nuclear safety and security. An extensive capacity building programme is essential for the safety and sustainability of a Nuclear Power Programme. Decision makers must be aware that capacity building for a NPP is multidisciplinary and multi institutional, undertaking with a scope, level of effort and cost well beyond that is normally required for other industrial developments. This awareness is essential for an informed government commitment, if a decision to embark on a NPP is made.
What should the ANSN pursue for 'Capacity Building'?
- There is a strong need to build capacity in nuclear safety in Asia. ANSN member states planning to engage in nuclear and radiation technologies need to develop the supporting national infrastructure to meet nuclear safety and security objectives as a long term commitment, paying special attention to human resource development through education and training programmes that emphasize the importance of a strong safety culture.
- It is essential that the operator, the regulator and the technical and scientific support organization (TSO) have a common, science-based understanding and the appropriate practical expertise to achieve the ultimate goal of protecting people, society and the environment. These entities work independently but also to create synergies and to enable the operator, the regulator and the TSO to make their judgements and decisions regarding safety in a responsible and timely manner.
How is the ANSN pursuing 'Capacity Building'? - the ANSN Vision and its Action Plan and implementing groups
- The ANSN currently has 8 topical groups (TGs) in the field of; Governmental and Regulatory Infrastructure, Education and Training, Siting, Safety Analysis, Operational Safety of NPP, Radioactive Waste Management, Emergency Preparedness and Response, and Safety Management of Research Reactors. The ANSN TGs are forefront of the ANSN activities for capacity building for nuclear safety infrastructure development.
- In April 2009, the ANSN developed ‘The Vision for the ANSN by the Year 2020’: being a strong human and advanced IT network to acquire, create and share nuclear safety knowledge and experience. The ANSN Self-assessment Coordination Group (SACG) was established in November 2009 to coordinate and monitor ANSN TGs’ activities towards achieving the Vision 2020.
- The CBCG developed ‘Generic Action Plan for establishing the Regional Capacity Building System in Asia’ as a road map to implement the Vision 2020. The Generic Action Plan proposes to establish a dynamic and interactive system for enhancing the Regional Capacity Building System in Asia through facilitating face-to-face cooperative activities and interactive use of state-of-the-art IT technology (i.e. Capacity Building IT Modules, namely e-Library, online communication, pool of experts and online planning).
- The CBMG is promoting the regional cooperation for Peer Review and Support Arrangement (PReSA) in cooperation with the IAEA; a systematic approach to support capacity building for establishing safety infrastructure for nuclear power programmes, sequentially for self-assessment, peer review and regional and national activities for filling the gaps identified.
Where is the ANSN going ahead?
- The ANSN will continue taking a leading role to practically implement the IAEA’s nuclear safety capacity building Generic Action Plan (see below) and to share lessons to be learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident for achieving a high level of nuclear safety of the existing, expanding and embarking on nuclear power programmes in the region and beyond, in cooperation with the IAEA.
- The ANSN continues attaching strategic importance to strengthen cooperation among the global and regional networks (i.e. Global Nuclear Safety Network (GNSSN), Ibro-American Forum of Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Security Regulatory Agencies (FORO), Forum for Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa (FNRBA), Arab Network for Nuclear Regulators (ANNuR), and European TSO Network (ETSON)) to further explore mutually beneficial cooperation for enhancing Capacity Building internationally, regionally and nationally.
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 What is Capacity Building Generic Action Plan? - 3 phases approach
- The IAEA’s nuclear safety and security capacity building Generic Action Plan (GAP) takes into consideration: (1) Safety Guide for Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme used in conjunction with Agency Nuclear Energy Series No. NG-G-3.1, Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power; and (2) the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans and provides a road map for Member States to develop State-specific action plans.
- GAP is a model for gradual capacity building during the 3 phases of development of the safety infrastructure for a NPP. The model identifies eleven thematic areas required for the establishment of the safety and security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme. Competencies required in each area are those necessary for the implementation of the actions proposed in the SSG-16 (formerly DS 424) and the relevant IAEA safety standards.
- The model takes into consideration that in phase 1 it is necessary to create national awareness of the complexity, magnitude and commitments associated to the prospective NPP. This is essential for an informed decision making process.
- Once a decision is made to embark on a NPP, competencies will be needed in phase 2 to evaluate the Programme needs, to plan specific activities, build new institutions or enhance existing ones and to create organizational structures. Technical and managerial knowledge and skills will need to be developed.
- In phase 3, the NPP will move to the implementation and the actual construction work will go on. During this phase the plant owner/operator, the regulatory body, the technical services providers, and the other industrial and governmental organizations will need to develop competencies to fulfil their responsibilities and to ensure the long term safety of the NPP. Figure 1 shows the different phases and the milestone as well as the involvement of government, regulatory body and the operating organization in each phase of the nuclear power programme.
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What aspects should be explored in each phase
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A structured approach for embarking countries to build the required competencies would require specific consideration of their evolving needs in the various phases of safety infrastructure, the target persons and organizations, the type and depth of knowledge required.
A model describing the relationship among these aspects in the 3 initial phases of the NPP is shown in the adjacent figure. The model identifies:
- the principal target organizations, namely: the government, the regulatory body, the operating organization, research institutions, technical support organizations and academic institutions.
- the knowledge required for the development of a national policy for capacity building; for creating the national institutions required for implementing the nuclear programme and for education and training of the work force.
- the education and training required in subject/thematic areas at basic, specialized and expert knowledge levels.
- The first aspect is related to the formulation of a national human resources development (HRD) policy that will ensure conditions to attract, train and maintain the competent work force required for a NPP. It needs also to ensure that safety related knowledge transfer is properly addressed in all relevant international contracts and agreements that the country will sign. The policy should reflect the importance that the government gives to the nuclear programme and recognize the social value of the work force. It should offer tenure career opportunities in institutions of the nuclear programme, support to graduate studies in the country and abroad with employment guaranties upon the completion of the studies. Salaries and benefits will need to be established at a level competitive to other fields.
- The second aspect is the establishment of institutions with the required competencies. This involves the assessment of needs both technical and managerial, against frameworks of competence related to the functions of the different institutions and developing programmes to develop the necessary knowledge and skills. Decisions will need to be made to create new institutions for HRD or to strengthen existing ones and to prepare curricula addressing the safety related subjects. Of utmost importance is to ensure that knowledge is recognized by the institutions as a valuable asset and that they create a knowledge management system to capture, retain, create and share knowledge.
- The third aspect is related to provision of basic, specialized and expert knowledge related to subject/thematic nuclear safety topics. The extensive material that the IAEA has developed to date is a good basis for assistance.
As an illustration of the application of the proposed model, the 14 HRD actions proposed in SSG-16 have been analysed with respect to their relevance to the target groups, area of assistance, knowledge needed and the phase of the programme development. The mapping of the actions against the framework is displayed in adjacent figure.
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How does IAEA support member states to apply the Generic Action Plan? - 11 safety modules and the associated safety packages
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In order to structure the thematic areas, the safety elements described in SSG-16 have been grouped in 11 safety modules. A common structure was then developed to reflect the various mechanisms for the provision of IAEA assistance for capacity building. Figures 3 and 4 below depict respectively the safety modules and the associated safety packages that the IAEA is developing to support capacity building.
The following provides an overview of the 11 safety modules.
- Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety – actions 1-60 of DS424 are lumped in Module 1 - the role of government in establishment of the national policy and strategy for safety of the nuclear power programme; the legal framework for safety; regulatory approaches; the role, functions and working processes of the regulatory body; involvement of the public and other stakeholders; the elements of the global nuclear safety regime; and the actions necessary to establish the safety infrastructure. Please refer Module 1
- Human Resources Development – Actions 85-98 are lumped in Module 2- the elements for the formulation and implementation of a national policy for human resources development for a NPP; the competencies needed for the organizations involved; and means of obtaining and sustaining the required level of expertise. Please refer Module 2
- Leadership and Management for Safety, Safety in the Operating Organization and Preparation for Commissioning – Actions 72-84, 146-159 and 185-188 are lumped in Module 3- role of leadership and management for safety; development of management systems, and promotion of safety culture. Please referModule 3
- Radiation Protection – Action 105-116 are lumped in Module 4 - the application of radiation protection principles for formulation of radiation protection criteria, an operational radiation protection programme; and role and scope of the radiological impact environmental programme; and the role of radiation protection in design and preparation for commissioning. Please refer Module 4
- NPP Site Survey, Selection and Evaluation – Actions 160-169 are lumped in Module 5 - steps and associated actions related to site survey, site selection and site evaluation; and the many and complex technical and environmental considerations in site evaluation. Please refer Module 5
- Safety of Radioactive Waste, Spent Fuel and Decommissioning – Actions 122-132 are lumped in Module 6 - the policy and strategy options and decisions required relative to defining a long term strategy for radioactive waste management (including waste disposal), spent fuel management and decommissioning; and the actions necessary to ensure safety. Please refer Module 6
- Emergency Preparedness and Response – Actions 133 – 145 are lumped in Module 7 - roles and responsibilities of the national institutions involved; emergency planning and preparedness in the operating organization and other institutions; and international cooperation programmes. Please refer Module 7
- External Organizations and Contractors – Action 61-71 are lumped in Module 8 - actions necessary to develop national technical expertise, services and industrial capability needed in support to the nuclear power programme; and for management and oversight of external support organizations and contractors. Please refer Module 8
- Safety Assessment, Design Safety and Safety Research - Actions 117-121, 170-184 and 99-104 are lumped in Module 9 - resources required for safety assessment; the scope and contents of the safety assessment and review process by the operating organization and the regulatory body; safety considerations in design of nuclear power plants and in the bid specification and evaluation; and long term planning for safety research and competence building. Please refer Module 9
- Transport Safety – Actions 189-192 are lumped in Module 10 - legal and regulatory framework for transport of nuclear fuel, radioactive waste and spent fuel, and actions required to address competence areas for the transport regulator and international safety requirements. Please refer Module 10
- Interface between Nuclear Safety and Security – Actions 193 – 200 are lumped in Module 11 - safety and security commonalities and differences; roles and responsibilities of the operating organization and national authorities; physical protection measures; and security considerations in design. Please refer Module 11
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What tasks should be achieved for Capacity Building?
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Seven tasks are suggested as below. The objective of the tasks is to ensure that the competence building work for establishing the safety and security infrastructure for the NPP is addressed in a systematic way: self-assessment, independent safety reviews, knowledge gap identification and expert advisory services for the application of the IAEA safety standards.
- Task 1: Overall understanding of the elements of the nuclear safety infrastructure.
- Task 2: Competence gaps for the implementation of phase 1 actions (SSG-16)
- Task 3: Building competence for the implementation of phase 1 actions
- Task 4: Competence gaps for the implementation of phase 2 actions (SSG-16)
- Task 5: Building competence for implementation of phase 2 actions
- Task 6: Competence gaps for the implementation of phase 3 actions
- Task 7: Building competence for implementation of phase 3 actions
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